TO ADMIT, OR NOT TO ADMIT, THAT IS THE QUESTION

"Fair is foul and foul is fair."
— Macbeth

INTRODUCTION

Legal construction has a way of drawing boundaries-not just around actions but around the consequences that follow them. What happens when the process which is meant to be an unearthing process of truth gets tainted with illegalities? Would justice be meted out if the very means used for securing evidence were marred with misconduct and criminality?

In a courtroom, evidence is power, but if evidence is misappropriated and mishandled by violating rights of civilians and/or by crossing lines, the ripple effect of such actions would go way beyond the facts of a particular case. That is when the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine comes into play; it casts an aspersive eye on the legitimacy of evidence arising from violation of legal standards.

The examples of how evidence could be compromised by illicit methods appear endless such as confessions obtained under police torture, a document acquired by bribing officials, or searches conducted with a fake magistrate[1].

These examples demonstrate how evidence gathered illegally should be excluded under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine. Each example fortifies the very thrust, which is that justice cannot be built upon a foundation offending a right or contrary to law. In some sense, that is what the doctrine does: It acts as a shield ensuring that the pursuit of truth itself would not be at the cost of fairness and the rule of law.

STANCE OF THE US COURTS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE

The principle therefore states that if the source of evidence (the "tree") is adulterated, then anything produced from it, i.e., the "fruit" would also contaminate and as such, be inadmissible in the court of law[2].

The doctrine derives its roots from the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment, which protects private rights of citizens. It was supposed to void violations, deny the government benefits it derived from its wrongdoing, and assure the moral integrity of the courts and the government as Constitutional authorities.

Before 1914, the U.S. legal system used to allow and admit evidences obtained through warrantless and illegal searches, with little consideration of how it was obtained. All this came to a sharp end in the landmark case of Fremont Weeks v. United States[3], where the law enforcement officers executed a warrantless search of Weeks' residence. The US Supreme Court had to answer an important question: was it proper to use evidence seized under circumstances that violated the Fourth Amendment? In this case, the Court reversed Weeks' conviction based on its reliance on the Fourth Amendment which meant that the exclusionary rule was judicially invented and imposed, barring the use of evidence gained by unconstitutional means.

Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States held that evidence acquired unlawfully cannot be used, as doing so would render the Fourth Amendment meaningless.

However, the doctrine was first named and used by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the case of Nardone v. United States[4] where the court reversed convictions because the evidence had been obtained through illegal methods, i.e., wiretapping.

Similarly, Wong Sun v. United States[5] remains the most comprehensive US Supreme Court decision on the doctrine. In this case, the Court established a two-part test to find whether evidence is tainted by the initial illegality:

1. The rule is not applied if the evidence is obtained through an independent source and not by an illegal act.

2. The rule does not apply if the connection between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence becomes so remote that the original taint is removed.

The Court made clear that just because some evidence was unearthed due to illegal actions by the police, not all evidences can be classified as the "fruit of the poisonous tree.". However, the doctrine remains firm in the US and other liberal jurisdictions, and this type of evidence is routinely excluded by courts.

But is it the same in India? Though constitutional rights play a very important role, this doctrine is yet to be judicially admitted by the Indian courts. Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, thus, is left inconclusive with no proper application of such principle till date.

INDIAN COURTS AND THE TAINTED EVIDENCE DEBATE

The Indian courts have approached this question, by going with the flexible rule that relevance of an evidence precedes the method of its acquisition. The Indian law is now being governed by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (‘BSA’), which also does not ban the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, just like the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘IEA’). Section 3 of the BSA postulates that if an evidence has any relevance, then it should be admitted regardless of the method through which it was obtained. Therefore, in essence, the test under the Indian Jurisprudence is of relevancy, differing from the exclusionary rule applied in the United States.

Several landmark judgments dealt with the issue of allowing tainted evidence, which have shaped the legal landscape of India and reflect the judicial approach  that has evolved on the question of admission of evidence obtained through illegal or doubtful methods.

In “R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra[6]”, the Supreme Court had to answer whether a tape-recorded conversation obtained illegally by a sting operation could be admitted into evidence. The Court laid down a much-needed precedent that doubtful evidence obtained by distrust means could still be admissible, provided it is relevant and has not obtained through compulsion.

Another landmark case that furthered this doctrine was “Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Income Tax)[7]”. In that case, the appellant's premises were searched and certain documents were seized by the Income Tax Authorities without following the proper procedure. The question which was posed before the Court was that the seized documents had been obtained illegally and therefore were inadmissible. The Supreme Court found such an argument to be meritless and instead held the relevancy of the evidence to be the primary consideration. The court also held that evidence, whether it is illegally obtained or not, is admissible if relevant to the case to prove a fact unless the fact to which it relates are specifically covered by specific provisions of law. In addition, the courts held that if a violation of procedure is demonstrated, this would not necessarily make the evidence inadmissible, unless the violation constitutes in itself a substantive legal breach.

Furthermore, in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu[8] the question revolved around the legality and admissibility of intercepted telephone calls governed under the Telegraph Act. The court held that evidence is admissible regardless of how it has been obtained. There is but always a word of caution, which is that the judge has a discretion to disallow evidence in a criminal case if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused, which is the golden rule in criminal jurisprudence.

The law in India has remained the same since a decade, the recent case of Yashwant Singa and Ors vs CBI[9]where the court relied on the landmark judgment of Pooran Mal which held that the context for material being considered by the court is relevancy unless there is an express or implied constitutional provision. Further the case also highlighted the commonality between the common laws of India and England and that the context for material being considered is relevancy.

Therefore, taking into account the landmark judgments by the Supreme Court it is well established that the legality of how evidence is obtained does not bear on its admissibility in court, so long as it is relevant to the matter being adjudicated. This principle reinforces the importance of ensuring that all relevant evidence is presented in court, ensuring a fair trial and the proper administration of justice, even when procedural violations occur during the collection of such evidence.

Although courts have conventionally favoured relevance and interest of justice, recent development, particularly the judicial decision in “Puttaswamy v. Union of India”[10], in 2017 declaring privacy as a fundamental right, introduced extra layers to the argument. Questions arise regarding whether illegally obtained evidence, either through surveillance or violation of privacy, should be excluded from judicial processes in protecting individual rights, like privacy.

Similarly, following the decisions of the Supreme Court, the Delhi High Court in the case of Deepti Kaur vs Kunal Julka[11] dealt with whether right to privacy being recognised as a fundamental right could change the stance of admissibility in India. The court in this case held that while the right to privacy is important, it cannot override the right of a party to present relevant evidence. The right to a fair trial has public consequences, and public justice would be undermined if relevant evidence were excluded at the outset merely because it was obtained through breach of privacy.

On these lines, the decision in the case of “Selvi v. State of Karnataka[12]” raised the bar and was a forthcoming step in the right direction. Till date, it represents an important development in the debate about tainted evidence, particularly relating to the area of individual rights. This related as to how the court debated whether statements obtained through the practices of narco-analysis, polygraph tests, and brain-mapping techniques could be admissible in courts as such practices were coercive and sought to undermine the fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court declared involuntary confessions or statements obtained through coercion inadmissible in court. It made an impression that such techniques involved a violation of the rights of the accused and therefore could not be permissible based merely on relevance. The judgment reaffirmed the imperative of safeguarding individual rights during the evidence collection process-that the nation is set to turn more stringent in ensuring protection against tainted evidence.

CONCLUSION

As of now, the Indian legal scenario remains to face the issue of admitting tainted evidence. Indian courts maintain wide discretionary power to admit or exclude evidence based on its relevance and the fairness of its acquisition. On the other hand, this discretionary approach has led to inconsistencies of judicial decisions. The courts have applied different standards for admitting tainted evidence. Calls for legislative reforms have also been made in the past for clearer guidelines on this issue, ensuring that the law is more predictable and in line with the international standards on the protection of rights and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.

The Law Commission of India, in its 94^th report back in 1983 suggested the incorporation of a provision Section 166-A in chapter 10 of the IEA, which read that the discretion lies with the court and if it is of the opinion that because of the nature of the illegal or improper means by which it was obtained its admission would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The Supreme Court in the case of State of MP vs Paltan Mallah and Ors[13] stated that none of the above was ever implemented and the courts in India continue to go by the dictum, ‘even if illegally obtained, it would be admissible.’

When the means used to obtain evidence are compromised, can the ends be truly considered fair? The blind adherence to landmark judgments that prioritize relevance over legality may uphold certain convictions, but it risks violating fairness and transparency. Ultimately, the question of whether justice can be achieved with tainted evidence still remains, and without clear legislative reform, the doctrine of "fair is foul and foul is fair" continues to cast a shadow over the Indian legal system.

[1] The example has been taken from the 94^th Report of the law Commission of India on Evidence obtained illegally or improperly; efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/uploads/2022/08/2022080824-1  

[2] Poison Tree Principle: It's Applicability in India, International Journal of Advanced Research and Development, ISSN: 2455-4030, Vol. 3 Iss. 1, 2018, pp. 370-375

[3] 1914 SCC OnLine US SC 61

[4] 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939)

[5] 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

[6] 1973 SCC (1) 471

[7] [1974] 1 S.C.C. 345

[8] (2005) 11 SCC 600

[9] (2019) 6 SCC  1 

[10] 2019 (1) SCC 1

[11] 2020 SCC OnLine Del 672

[12] AIR 2010 SC 1974

[13] (2005) 3 SCC 169